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JUST SAY NO: FORECLOSING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
EMPLOYEES SEEKING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
UNDER THE NEW JERSEY COMPASSIONATE USE MEDICAL
MARIJUANA ACT
Dustin Stark

*

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 2010, New Jersey passed the New Jersey
1
Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (NJCUMMA or “Act”).
The Act passed with mostly positive support in both the House and
2
the Senate, and Governor Jon Corzine signed it into law on January
3
4
18, 2010, Governor Corzine’s last full day in office. The bill was one
5
of fifty-five that Corzine signed on that day. This seemingly rushed
procedure stands as a precursor to what a reading of the statute’s text
reveals: a poorly written law that avoids answering many of the
important issues in this complicated area of law. The NJCUMMA
leaves unanswered many key questions regarding medical marijuana
in the employment law context, and, specifically, the accommodation
of an employee’s off-site use of medical marijuana. The problems
and extensive litigation that arise when a medical marijuana statute is
6
silent on this issue have begun to emerge in other states.
One of the major driving forces behind enacting medical
marijuana statutes is the results of recent medical research suggesting
*
B.A. Cornell University, J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law. Special
thanks to everyone that helped out along the way.
1
Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG
(Feb. 8, 2012, 9:04 AM), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=000881#NewJersey.
2
Id. The House voted to pass the Act 48–14, and the Senate passed the Act by a
vote of 25–13. Id.
3
Id.
4
Corzine signs medical marijuana bill on last day in office, N.Y. POST, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/corzine_signs_medical_marijuana_14Gz0yct
GPxX71ySAf83JL.
5
Corzine signs medical marijuana law, ABCLOCAL.GO.COM (Jan. 18, 2010),
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=7224843.
6
See infra Part IV.
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7

the drug’s beneficial effects. As a reason for its enactment, the
NJCUMMA specifically notes the potential use of marijuana to treat
or alleviate pain and other symptoms associated with certain medical
8
conditions. Yet, despite research showing the drug’s potential for
medical use, marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance
9
under the Controlled Substance Act. As a Schedule I drug, the
federal government considers marijuana to be a drug with a high
10
11
potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use, and a lack
12
of safety for using the drug under medical supervision. This means
that under federal law, all possession or distribution of marijuana—
13
medical or not—is prohibited.
To date, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have
14
enacted medical marijuana statutes. Medical marijuana statutes are
15
also pending in other states. A common thread amongst all of these
statutes is an emphasis on protection from state criminal
16
prosecution.
Some of these statutes explicitly protect employees
against discrimination or retaliation based on medical marijuana
17
use.
The NJCUMMA has no such provision. The Act neither
7

Stacy A. Hickox, Clearing the Smoke on Medical Marijuana Users in the Workplace,
29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 (2011) (stating that “cannabinoids found in
marijuana are known to relieve pain in patients who cannot otherwise find relief
because of the adverse side effects from other analgesics”).
8
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-2 (West 2011) (“Modern medical research has
discovered a beneficial use for marijuana in treating or alleviating the pain or other
symptoms associated with certain debilitating medical conditions, as found by the
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in March 1999.”).
9
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
10
§ 812(b)(1)(A).
11
§ 812(b)(1)(B).
12
§ 812(b)(1)(C).
13
§ 844(a).
14
Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1.
15
Hickox, supra note 7, at 1003 (directing to summaries and links to bills).
16
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.37.030 (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362811 (West 2011); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011); COLO. CONST.
art. XVIII, § 14 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010 amendments); HAW. REV. STAT. §
329-125 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.26424 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 453A.200 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-2 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 26-2B-4 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.316 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
21-28.6-4 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4474b (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 69.51A.040 (West 2011).
17
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(B) (West 2011).
Unless a failure to do so would cause an employer to lose a monetary
or licensing related benefit under federal law or regulations, an
employer may not discriminate against a person in hiring, termination
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explicitly denies nor explicitly creates a private cause of action for
employees to combat such discrimination.
18
Like many other state medical marijuana statutes, the
NJCUMMA explicitly states that an employer is not required to
19
accommodate an employee’s use of marijuana “in any workplace.”
This type of limited language in a medical marijuana statute, which
explicitly prohibits only on-site use or being under the influence of
marijuana at work, may imply that accommodation is required for use
20
outside of the workplace. A noted pitfall of medicinal marijuana
statutes is their failure to address the accommodation of medical
marijuana users who do not use marijuana at work or come to work
21
under the influence of the drug.
Many of these statutes fail to
explicitly resolve this issue, and because “THC metabolites can be
detected long after a user is impaired or influenced by the use of
marijuana . . . medical marijuana users may still face discharge,” even
if the user does not use marijuana in the workplace or come to work
22
under the influence. Some argue that “[b]y negative inference, the
failure to mention accommodation for employees who test positive
on an employer-administered drug test, but who are not ‘under the
influence’ at work, suggests that [such employees] could seek
23
accommodations.”
Following this line of reasoning, a medical
marijuana user may request an accommodation “in the form of an
24
exception to a zero-tolerance for positive drug tests.”
A closer examination of the NJCUMMA reveals that, while an

or imposing any term or condition of employment or otherwise
penalize a person based upon either: (1) The person’s status as a
cardholder[; or] (2) A registered qualifying patient’s positive drug test
for marijuana components or metabolites, unless the patient used,
possessed or was impaired by marijuana on the premises of the place of
employment or during the hours of employment.
Id.
18

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.37.040(d)(1) (West 2011); COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 14(10)(b) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010 amendments); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22. § 2426(2)(B) (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26427(c)(2)
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-205(2)(b) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
453A.800(2) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.340(2) (West 2011); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6-7(b)(2) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060(4)
(West 2011).
19
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2011).
20
Hickox, supra note 7, at 1009.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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employer would obviously be free to make such an accommodation,
employers are under no obligation to acquiesce to such a request.
Nevertheless, creative plaintiffs will likely bring failure-toaccommodate suits due to the lack of absolute clarity in the
NJCUMMA’s language. As a result, the Legislature should amend the
NJCUMMA to clarify this issue and foreclose the possibility that New
Jersey employers will be subject to expensive and ultimately fruitless
litigation. The amendment to the Act should include explicit
language clarifying that nothing in the Act should be construed to
prevent an employer from maintaining a drug-free workplace.
Part II of this Comment examines the plain language and
legislative history of the NJCUMMA, as well as the current state of the
Act’s implementation. Part III provides an overview of New Jersey’s
employment law regime and analyzes how the NJCUMMA fits into
this framework. Part IV discusses court decisions from other states
involving employees’ off-site use of medical marijuana and predicts
how these cases would be decided under New Jersey law. In Part V,
this Comment suggests how to amend and improve the NJCUMMA to
avoid unnecessary litigation by adding language that preserves an
employer’s right to maintain a drug-free workplace.
II. THE NEW JERSEY COMPASSIONATE USE MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT
A. Plain Language of the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical
Marijuana Act
Similar to other state medical marijuana statutes, the NJCUMMA
fails to fully flesh out how employers should treat employees that use
25
medical marijuana while not on the job. Once medical marijuana is
distributed in New Jersey, litigation on this issue will be inevitable.
To fully understand where the Act is lacking, we must first examine
the plain language of the Act. Courts interpreting medical marijuana
statutes in other states have limited potential causes of action based
26
on what is said and what is not said in the statute.
Initially, the NJCUMMA limits the class of people who could
27
potentially have access to medical marijuana to only the seriously ill.
Specifically, marijuana is medically available via prescription to
patients who will be able to use the marijuana to “alleviate suffering

25
26
27

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part IV.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3 (West 2011).
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from debilitating medical conditions.”
NJCUMMA defines
“debilitating medical condition” to include seizure disorders
(including epilepsy), intractable skeletal muscular spasticity, or
29
glaucoma. This definition also includes positive status for human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune deficiency
30
Other “debilitating medical
syndrome (AIDS), or cancer.
conditions” include amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, multiple sclerosis,
terminal cancer, muscular dystrophy, inflammatory bowel disease
(including Crohn’s disease), terminal illness (if the physician has
determined a prognosis of less than twelve months of life), and “any
other medical condition or its treatment that is approved by the
31
department by regulation.”
The extreme nature of these
“debilitating medical conditions” creates a more limited class of
32
potential medical marijuana patients than in some other states.
These conditions are not, however, so extreme that any person with
them would be confined to a hospital bed. This means that, in New
Jersey, medical marijuana users are likely to be employed individuals
who will continue to work for their employer during their time as a
medical marijuana patient. Furthermore, the Act reserves the right
to add additional medical conditions to this list through department
33
regulations, meaning that the potential class of patients is open to
expansion.
The main stated purpose of the NJCUMMA is to “protect from
arrest, prosecution, property forfeiture, and criminal and other
penalties, those patients who use marijuana to alleviate suffering
34
from debilitating medical conditions.”
The NJCUMMA also
provides protection from prosecution under state law for others

28

§ 24:6I-2(e).
§ 24:6I-3. In addition, these conditions must be resistant to conventional
medical therapy. Id.
30
Id. In addition, there is the added requirement for these conditions that
severe or chronic pain, severe nausea or vomiting, cachexia, or wasting syndrome
results from the condition or treatment thereof. Id.
31
Id.
32
Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011).
[S]eriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana
for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate
and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that
the person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the
treatment of . . . any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
Id.
33
§ 24:6I-3.
34
§ 24:6I-2.
29
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35

involved in the medical marijuana distribution system. This stated
purpose seems to imply that the Act is intended solely to protect
36
qualified patients from state criminal prosecution.
The Act also explicitly limits the availability of certain activities
37
and protections to medical marijuana patients. Conduct explicitly
not permitted under the NJCUMMA includes operating any vehicle,
aircraft, train, boat, or heavy machinery while under the influence of
38
marijuana.
The Act also exempts from protection smoking
marijuana on a school bus, on public transportation, in a currently
operating private vehicle, on any school ground, in any “correctional
facility, at any public park or beach, at any recreation center, or in
any place where smoking is prohibited pursuant to [New Jersey’s
39
public smoking statute].”
Limiting the Act’s application in the employment context, the
Act states “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to require . . . an employer
40
to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.” This
provision seemingly makes a request for accommodation an open
and shut case: the NJCUMMA does not require an employer to
accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace. There
are, however, three potential interpretations of the phrase “use of
marijuana in any workplace.” First, it could mean that the only action
an employer need not accommodate is the actual smoking or
ingestion of medical marijuana while in the workplace. Second, this
phrase could mean that an employer need not accommodate an
employee who comes to work under the influence of medical
marijuana. A third interpretation is that an employer need not
accommodate the presence of THC metabolites in the system of a
medical marijuana patient-employee.
This third possible
interpretation of the phrase “use in any workplace” would mean that
an employer is not required to accommodate a request from an
employee that he or she be given a “pass” on a drug test that would

35

§ 24:6I-6 (“No person shall be subject to arrest or prosecution for constructive
possession, conspiracy or any other offense for simply being in the presence or
vicinity of the medical use of marijuana as authorized under this act.”).
36
But see Melissa Brown, Comment, The Garden State Just Got Greener: New Jersey is
the Fourteenth State in the Nation to Legalize Medical Marijuana, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
1519, 1551 (2011) (arguing that the NJCUMMA only provides an affirmative defense
to medical marijuana patients, not protection from arrest and prosecution).
37
§ 24:6I-8.
38
§ 24:6I-8(a).
39
§ 24:6I-8(b).
40
§ 24:6I-14 (emphasis added).
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reveal (still federally illegal) marijuana use.
The language of the Act is ambiguous enough that it will not
deter an ambitious plaintiff from bringing (and possibly succeeding)
on a failure-to-accommodate claim. A problem arises from the fact
that “use in any workplace” is quite different than home-use of
medical marijuana during non-working hours. This language is
bound to cause confusion. The Act mentions nothing about
employer accommodation of an employee’s off-site use of medical
marijuana, despite the obvious fact that most medical marijuana users
administer the drug in the privacy of their homes.
How long marijuana stays in a person’s system depends on how
41
often marijuana is used. This means that an employee could test
positive for marijuana in an employer-administered drug test even
though he or she did not “use” medical marijuana in the workplace.
Arguably, a requested accommodation (e.g., allowing a positive drug
test result or requesting an alternate form of a drug test that would
test for something other than “leftover” remnants of medical
marijuana) must be granted under the current language of the
42
NJCUMMA.
The Legislature should amend this portion of the
statute to clarify this issue and to prevent costly litigation, which is
likely to arise as a result of this ambiguity. The best solution is to
amend the Act to include the following language: “Nothing in this act
should be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the
medical use of marijuana or change existing drug policies.”
Employers should not be forced to accommodate employee use of a
drug that remains illegal under federal law.
Compassionate
employers may still voluntarily make an accommodation for a
medical marijuana patient, but forcing employers to allow employees
to use drugs that are illegal under federal law is bad policy. While at
some point it may be necessary to reevaluate this policy if marijuana
is decriminalized at the federal level, we have not yet reached that
point and, as a result, any legally required accommodation for
medical marijuana use is unwarranted.
Even if the “use in any workplace” language is interpreted to
mean that an employer need not make any accommodation

41

Mental
Heath—Marijuana
and
Its
Effects,
WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/marijuana-use-and-its-effects (last visited
Feb. 12, 2012) (“Light users—those who smoke pot once in a while—will have a
negative drug screen after a marijuana-free week. Heavy users . . . may continue
testing positive for a month after last smoking pot.”).
42
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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whatsoever for a medical marijuana patient-employee,
this
interpretation is complicated by other language in the Act. The
NJCUMMA states:
A qualifying patient . . . or any other person acting in
accordance with the provisions of this act shall not be subject
to any civil or administrative penalty, or denied any right or
privilege, including, but not limited to, civil penalty or
disciplinary action by a professional licensing board, related
44
to the medical use of marijuana as authorized under this act.
Nearly identical language also appears in the Assembly Committee
45
46
Statement and Senate Committee Statement regarding the
NJCUMMA. This language seems to suggest the Act offers a certain
protection of rights for medical marijuana patient-employees.
Specifically, a plaintiff may argue that any adverse employment action
taken against him or her on the basis of medical marijuana use
qualifies as a denial of a right or privilege under the New Jersey Law
47
48
Against Discrimination (NJLAD). This argument is likely to fail,
but to avoid confusion and unnecessary litigation, the Legislature
must amend the Act’s language. It would be wise to include language
stating: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent an
employer from taking adverse employment action against an
employee as a result of a positive result in a drug test for THC
metabolites.”
B. Legislative Findings and Declarations
The text of the NJCUMMA outlines the legislative findings and
49
declarations behind the Act. The Act notes that modern medical
research has discovered beneficial uses for marijuana “in treating or
alleviating the pain or other symptoms associated with certain
50
debilitating medical conditions.” It also notes that fourteen other
51
states have enacted laws permitting the use of medical marijuana,
and that New Jersey wishes to join this effort “for the health and
43

See infra Part IV for a discussion of the application of this interpretation in
other states.
44
§ 24:6I-6 (emphasis added).
45
GEN. ASSEMB. 213-804, at 4 (N.J. 2009).
46
S. 213-119, at 4 (N.J. 2009).
47
See infra Part III for further analysis of this argument.
48
See infra Part III.
49
§ 24:6I-2.
50
§ 24:6I-2(a).
51
§ 24:6I-2(c).
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52

welfare of its citizens.” The Act notes that states are not required to
enforce federal law, and, as such, “compliance with this act does not
53
put the State of New Jersey in violation of federal law.”
The Act emphasizes that because “[c]ompassion dictates that a
distinction be made between medical and non-medical uses of
marijuana,” one of the main purposes of the Act is to “protect from
arrest, prosecution, property forfeiture, and criminal and other
penalties, those patients who use marijuana to alleviate suffering
54
from debilitating medical conditions.” Language found elsewhere
in the Act, stating that nothing in the Act “is to be construed to
require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of
55
marijuana in any workplace,” echoes the Senate Assembly Health
and Senior Services Committee Statement.
The main focus of these declarations seems to be emphasizing
the Act’s main goal of removing criminal liability under state law for
patients involved in New Jersey’s medical marijuana program. But,
due to similar legislation in other states at the time of NJCUMMA’s
adoption, the New Jersey Legislature must have known that confusion
would arise over the issue of employer accommodation of employee
56
medical marijuana use. Yet it chose to avoid answering these hard
questions and remained silent. Because the NJCUMMA’s scope is
limited as compared to the more liberal medical marijuana statutes in
57
other states, a liberal interpretation of the Act would be out of line.
The Act’s main focus is to provide protection from state criminal
conviction, not to create a new right for employees. The Act should
have stated this distinction clearly in the “Findings and Declarations”
section. In sum, the discovery of medical benefits of marijuana and
the Act’s claim of compassionate goals are not enough to create a
new set of accommodation obligations for employers in New Jersey.

52

Id.
§ 24:6I-2(d).
54
§ 24:6I-2(e).
55
§ 24:6I-1.
56
See, e.g., DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1049 (N.J. 2005) (citing another
source) (“‘[T]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its
enactments.’”).
57
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011) (discussed infra
Part IV).
53
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58

The NJCUMMA is in its fledgling stage. Although the statute is
in effect, as of the time of this Comment’s publication, medical
59
marijuana has not been distributed in New Jersey. The NJCUMMA
60
was intended to become effective six months after it was enacted.
Despite this intention, the New Jersey Department of Health and
Senior Services (DHSS), the State Legislature, and New Jersey
Governor Chris Christie have struggled to reach a consensus on the
61
details of running the program. The DHSS website FAQs section
once indicated that medical marijuana patient registration would
62
begin in the latter part of 2011. After some delay, and as of August
63
8, 2012, the patient registry is open.
On July 19, 2011, Governor Christie announced his
authorization for the state to begin dispensing medical marijuana to
patients who qualify, despite his concern over whether federal
authorities could prosecute state employees or state-approved
64
growers. Governor Christie explained that the delay was caused in
part by his desire to roll out the program in a way that would
“withstand legal scrutiny” and simultaneously help those in need of
65
medical marijuana. Governor Christie also expressed a desire to
avoid “the type of real societal problems that you see . . . [in]
66
Colorado or California.” Governor Christie expressed a belief that
the medical marijuana programs in these states “are significantly out
of control and leading to other problems in society that they were
67
never intended to cause or contribute to.”
Governor Christie
58

This section is current as of September 2012. For up to date information on
the NJCUMMA, visit the New Jersey Department of Health’s Medical Marijuana
Program website at http://www.state.nj.us/health/medicalmarijuana/.
59
Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Medicinal Marijuana Program: Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
(July
19,
2011),
http://www.state.nj.us/health/medicalmarijuana/faqs.shtml.
64
N.J. Medical Marijuana Gets Green Light by Gov. Christie, N.J. NEWS ROOM (July 19,
2011), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/healthquest/nj-medical-marijuana-getsgreen-light-by-gov-christie.
65
Chris Christie, Governor of New Jersey, Comments on the Resumption of New
Jersey’s Medical Marijuana Program (July 19, 2011), transcript available at
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/gov-chris-christies-comments-of-theresumption-of-new-jerseys-medical-marijuana-program.
66
Id.
67
Id. It is likely that Governor Christie used the phrases “out of control” and
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expressed a desire to limit the exposure of all parties involved to any
68
New Jersey towns have also been
risk of federal prosecution.
dragging their feet in approving permits for medical marijuana
69
centers.
Despite these delays, the slow progress of implementing the Act
is unlikely to stop the Act from coming to fruition. Eventually,
medical marijuana will be distributed in New Jersey and litigation will
arise out of adverse employment actions taken against medical
marijuana patients. It is best to amend the Act for clarification on
this topic and to preserve an employer’s right to maintain a drug-free
workplace before this type of litigation begins. While uncertainty in
the employment context is not the sole problem with the
70
NJCUMMA, it is among the major problems with the Act that calls
for resolution through decisive legislative action rather than through
unnecessary litigation. The New Jersey state government and local
townships’ hesitation and resistance could be reduced if issues such
as these are resolved by amending the Act before its full-blown
implementation. The resulting reduction in uncertainty would
benefit all parties involved.
D. Rules & Regulations
Rules promulgated under the NJCUMMA may be helpful in the
Act’s interpretation. Unfortunately, as of the time of this Comment’s
publication, the limited promulgated rules do not clarify the issue of
71
medical marijuana in the employment law context.
The DHSS
released draft rules outlining the registration and application process
72
on October 6, 2010. The DHSS held a public hearing to discuss the
73
proposed rules on December 6, 2010. In response, on December
20, 2010, Senator Nicholas Scutari, lead sponsor of the medical
“other problems in society” in reference to the ease of obtaining marijuana in these
states and the clashes that have occurred with federal authorities. See, e.g., Teens’ Ease
Of Getting Marijuana Blamed On Medical Pot Cards, 10NEWS.COM (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.10news.com/news/27378646/detail.html;
Debbi
Baker,
Medical
marijuana shop raided in Kearny Mesa, UTSANDIEGO.COM (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/jan/18/clairemont-marijuana-shop-raidec.
68
Id.
69
Amy Brittain, 2 Years after Being Approved, N.J. Medical Marijuana Program Still at
Seedling Stage, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/01/
2_years_after_being_approved_n.html.
70
See Brown, supra note 36, for a discussion of other pitfalls of the Act.
71
See N.J ADMIN. CODE § 8:64 et seq.
72
Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1.
73
Id.
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marijuana bill, submitted Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) 140
declaring that the “Board of Medical Examiners proposed medicinal
74
marijuana program rules are inconsistent with legislative intent.”
Additionally, the New Jersey Senate Health, Human Services and
Senior Citizens Committee held a public hearing to discuss SCR 140
75
and a similar bill, SCR 130, on January 20, 2011.
In response to the negative feedback on the draft version of the
76
rules, the DHSS proposed new rules that clarified the permit
process for growing and dispensing marijuana, barred home delivery
by alternative treatment centers, and mandated that “conditions
originally named in the Act be resistant to conventional medical
77
therapy in order to qualify as debilitating medical conditions.” The
new rules were adopted and became effective as of December 19,
78
Notably, the rules require the six Alternate Treatment
2011.
Centers—the six state-sanctioned sources of medical marijuana—to
“establish, implement and adhere to a written alcohol, drug-free and
79
smoke-free workplace policy.” Such policies would be required to
address “[t]he policy’s inapplicability if an employee, who is also a
qualifying patient, fails the drug test solely because of the presence of
80
marijuana in a confirmed positive test result.” The section of the
rules addressing exemption from state criminal and civil penalties for
81
the medical use of marijuana does not clarify this issue.
III. THE EXISTING CANON OF NEW JERSEY EMPLOYMENT LAW
The potential impact of the NJCUMMA cannot be fully
understood without an examination of New Jersey’s laws regarding
drug testing and protection from discrimination in the employment
context. With some limited restrictions, private employers are
82
permitted to use drug testing in New Jersey. This means it is very
likely that some employer will eventually encounter a situation in
which an employee or potential employee tests positive for THC as a
result of his or her medical marijuana use. When this occurs, the
employer may choose to fire or refuse to hire that employee. If that
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See N.J ADMIN. CODE § 8:64 et seq.
Id. at § 8.64-9.6(a).
Id. at § 8:64-9.6(c)(1).
See id. at § 8:64-13.11.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
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employee chooses to sue over this adverse employment action, he or
she is likely to bring claims for failure to make a reasonable
83
accommodation and for termination in violation of public policy.
The limited definition of conditions that qualify a patient for medical
84
marijuana under the NJCUMMA means that it is likely that this
plaintiff-employee would fall under New Jersey’s expansive definition
85
of “disabled,” and such a qualification is a pre-requisite to a
86
reasonable accommodation claim. The NJCUMMA is also likely to
stand as a clear source of public policy, opening the door for
87
plaintiffs to bring a “discharge in violation of public policy” claim.
Despite these apparent pitfalls, a closer assessment of New Jersey’s
employment law suggests that an employer is still likely to successfully
88
defend against these types of claims. This conclusion rests largely
89
on the limited scope of the NJCUMMA.
A. Drug Testing under New Jersey Law
New Jersey does not have statutory regulation of private-sector
90
drug testing. The New Jersey Supreme Court has placed some limits
91
on drug testing in the employment context. In Hennessey v. Coastal
92
Eagle Point Oil Co., the court implied “that common law privacy
rights forbid ‘random’ drug testing in the private sector except for
93
employees in ‘safety-sensitive’ positions.” Employees in non-safetysensitive positions “may be tested only ‘for cause,’ and all testing
programs must conform to certain procedural ‘due process’
94
guidelines . . . .” Pre-employment applicant drug testing is neither
prohibited under New Jersey law, nor restricted by the decision in
95
Hennessey.
83

This is what plaintiffs did in other states. See discussion infra Part IV.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3 (West 2011).
85
See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
86
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
87
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
88
See discussion infra Parts III.B.1–3.
89
Id.
90
Drug/Alcohol Testing of Employees in New Jersey, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (2011),
available at http://www.foxrothschild.com/uploadedFiles/newspublications/
PA_LE_DrugAlcoholTesting_NewJersey.pdf.
91
See, e.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992).
92
Id.
93
Drug/Alcohol Testing of Employees in New Jersey, supra note 90.
94
Id. (emphasis in original).
95
See Vargo v. Nat’l Exch. Carriers Ass’n, Inc., 870 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2005) (Noting a finding of no invasion of privacy expectations due to a
84
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These limited restrictions allow for the creation of numerous
opportunities for medical marijuana patients to test positive for
marijuana and either be denied employment (at the pre-employment
application phase) or terminated (for those in safety-sensitive
positions or those tested for cause in accordance with procedural
guidelines). For example, a medical marijuana patient in New Jersey
could be denied employment due to a routine pre-employment drug
96
screening that revealed the presence of THC in his or her system.
This type of drug test would be legal under New Jersey law, and it is
likely that the employer would refuse to hire that person as a result of
evidence indicating that he or she uses a federally illegal drug.
Clearly, “[f]rom an employer’s perspective, an employee’s use of
97
illegal drugs presents multiple problems.” The use of drugs that are
illegal under federal law “can affect an employee’s performance . . . ,
98
Still, the
endanger co-workers, and increase health-care costs.”
potential employee is likely to feel that he or she is being
discriminated against because of his or her status as a medical
marijuana user. As a result, the potential employee is likely to bring a
99
suit against the employer for its refusal to hire. This obvious conflict
between company drug policies and what is permitted under the
NJCUMMA is yet another reason why the Legislature should amend
the Act to allow companies to keep their existing drug testing policies
in place.
B. The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
Medical marijuana users who believe they were discriminated
against are likely to rely on New Jersey’s employee protection statute,
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), to support their
claim. Creative plaintiffs may argue that they were discriminated
against because of the underlying disability that led to their medical
marijuana use. Plaintiffs may also argue that a potential employer is
refusing to make a reasonable accommodation for their underlying
handicap that led to their medical marijuana use. The text of the
waiver on the part of the prospective employee where employer had “a long-standing
drug-free workplace policy and pre-employment drug screening policy for all
applicants for permanent positions,” and the potential employee knew of the policy
when he signed the “Terms and Conditions of Employment” and “voluntarily
submitted to the non-intrusive drug test in a private bathroom.”).
96
This was a subject of litigation in California. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
97
Hennessey, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring).
98
Id.
99
This was a subject of litigation in California. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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NJCUMMA, however, does not support these arguments, and
exposing employers to these types of liabilities and obligations has no
100
The NJCUMMA
foundation in the purpose underlying the Act.
should be amended to include language that limits the obligations of
employers and eliminates the confusion resulting from the conflict
between what is protected by the NJLAD and what is permitted under
the NJCUMMA.
1.

Disability under the NJLAD

To constitute a protected class—the first element of a prima
facie case for disability discrimination—a plaintiff must demonstrate
that he or she qualifies as an individual with a disability, or is
101
perceived as having a disability, as defined under the statute. This
102
As a result, it is likely that a plaintiff
burden is “rather modest.”
would fall within a protected class because of his or her underlying
disability that requires the use of medical marijuana. This chance is
compounded by the fact that the definition of “disability” in the
NJLAD has some overlap with the definition of “debilitating medical
103
condition” in the NJCUMMA.
Under the NJLAD’s federal counterpart, the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), a person “currently engaging in the illegal use
104
of drugs” is not a “qualified individual with a disability,” and
105
marijuana is still an “illegal drug” for the purposes of federal law.
106
Disability under the NJLAD is
The NJLAD, however, is dissimilar.
107
Under the NJLAD, the definition of
expansively defined.
100

See discussion infra Part II.A, II.B.
Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 140 (N.J. 2010).
102
Id.
103
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2011), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3
(West 2011).
104
42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(a) (West 2006) (Under the ADA, “a qualified individual
with a disability shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such
use”).
105
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (listing “Marihuana” as a Schedule I drug, defined as a
substance with “a high potential for abuse . . . no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States . . . [and] a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug
or other substance under medical supervision.”).
106
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2011).
107
Id.
[P]hysical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is
caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and
other seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to,
any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination,
101
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“disability” does not explicitly carve out illegal drug use.
Accordingly, users of illegal drugs—such as marijuana—are not
automatically barred from a claim of disability if they are subject to an
adverse employment action resulting from such use.
More importantly, many of the conditions that qualify as a
“disability” under the NJLAD overlap with the definition of
109
“debilitating medical condition” under the NJCUMMA.
For
example, like the NJCUMMA, the NJLAD also lists epilepsy, other
110
seizure disorders, AIDS, and HIV as qualifying disorders.
This
means that, in New Jersey, a medical marijuana patient’s ailment is
likely to fall under the definition of “disability” for purposes of the
NJLAD. A positive result for the presence of THC in a drug test
would be directly linked to the patient’s disability because a patient
uses medical marijuana for the purpose of alleviating his or her
disability. It is likely, then, that a plaintiff will be able to argue that an
adverse employment action in response to a positive drug test on
account of his or her use of medical marijuana was an adverse
employment action taken as a result of the disability itself.
Further supporting this notion is the fact that the NJLAD has
“broad remedial purposes and the wide scope of its coverage for
disabilities as compared to the ADA support an expansive view of
111
protecting rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace.”
Courts should construe the NJLAD “to prohibit any unlawful
discrimination against any person because such person is or has been
at any time disabled [as well as] any unlawful employment practice
against such person, unless the nature and extent of the disability
reasonably precludes the performance of the particular

blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment,
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or
guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or any
mental, psychological or developmental disability, including autism
spectrum disorders, resulting from anatomical, psychological,
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal
exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable,
medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory
diagnostic techniques. Disability shall also mean AIDS or HIV
infection.
Id.
108

See id.
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2011), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3
(West 2011).
110
Id.
111
Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 143 (N.J. 2010).
109
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112

employment.” The expansive reading and remedial purpose of the
NJLAD may supply plaintiffs with the argument that when an
employer takes an adverse employment action against them as a
result of their medical marijuana use, they were discriminated against
because of their disability.
2.

Reasonable Accommodation under the NJLAD

A medical marijuana user may request that an employer
accommodate his or her underlying disability in the form of a “free
113
pass” on a drug test. Judicial interpretations of the NJLAD will help
provide guidance for analyzing a reasonable accommodation claim
arising from a medical marijuana user. The NJLAD does not
specifically address reasonable accommodation, but New Jersey
courts “have uniformly held that the law nevertheless requires an
114
employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s handicap.”
To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim under the NJLAD,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the employer knew about the
employee’s disability; (2) the employee requested accommodations
or assistance for her disability; (3) the employer did not make a good
faith effort to assist; and (4) the employee could have been
115
reasonably accommodated.”
Unlike the ADA, the NJLAD “[is]
intended to cover more than just severe disabilities, and, accordingly,
does not require that the handicap substantially limit a major life
116
activity.”
New Jersey case law takes a very broad view of handicap,
expanding the definition to a point where almost anything can
117
preclude a grant of summary judgment for the employer.
Legal
precedent states that the NJLAD defines “handicap” more broadly
118
than the ADA’s comparable definition of “disability.” The NJLAD’s
119
statutory definition of “handicapped” is “very broad in its scope,”
112

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 2011).
Medical marijuana users have made similar accommodation requests in other
states. See discussion infra Part IV.
114
Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 798 A.2d 648, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002).
115
Peacock v. Albertsons Acme Mkts., 607 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (D.N.J. 2009).
116
Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 547 (D.N.J. 2000) (internal
quotations omitted).
117
See, e.g., Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 795 (D.N.J. 1997)
(issues of material fact existed as to whether employee’s varicose veins were a
handicap under NJLAD, precluding summary judgment).
118
Tynan, 798 A.2d at 655.
119
Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 803–04 (N.J. 1988) (holding that
alcoholism falls within the NJLAD’s definition of “handicapped”).
113
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and has been held to encompass ailments such as back ailment,
121
122
123
124
alcoholism,
obesity,
and drug addiction.
heart attack,
Regarding the applicability of the NJLAD to “handicapped” persons,
the statute states that “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to
obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of . . .
disability . . . subject only to conditions and limitations applicable
125
alike to all persons.”
Under the NJLAD, unless it is shown that “a
person’s disability would prevent such person from performing a
126
particular job,” it is unlawful to take an adverse employment action
127
“solely because such person is a person with a disability.”
In sum,
termination of an employee for a covered condition that does not
prevent the employee from doing his or her job is actionable under
128
the NJLAD.
With regard to making a reasonable accommodation for a
person with a disability or handicap, employers are required to
conduct their employment procedures in such a manner as
to [ensure] that all people with disabilities are given equal
consideration [as] people who do not have disabilities for
all aspects of employment including, but not limited to,
hiring, promotion, tenure, training, assignment, transfers,
129
and leaves on the basis of their qualifications and abilities.
An employee or potential employee’s ability to perform a particular
130
job “must be assessed on an individual basis.” Suggested reasonable
accommodations include, but are not limited to, job restructuring
131
and acquisition or modification of equipment or devices.
An employer must make a reasonable accommodation “unless
the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would
120

Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 483, 494 (N.J. 1982).
Panettieri v. C.V. Hill Refrigeration, 388 A.2d 630, 639 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1978).
122
Clowes, 538 A.2d at 804.
123
Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991).
124
In re Cahill, 585 A.2d 977, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
125
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2011) (the statute goes as far as to say that
“[t]his opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right”).
126
§ 10:5-29.1.
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., Svarnas v. AT&T Commc’ns, 740 A.2d 662, 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999).
129
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5 (2011).
130
Id.
131
Id.
121
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impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.” This
133
An employer is
determination is made on a case-by-case basis.
134
required to “consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation”
before taking an adverse employment action against an employee or
135
potential employee.
When determining whether the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s
business, courts will consider the nature of the accommodation
needed and “the extent to which accommodation would involve
waiver of an essential requirement of a job as opposed to a tangential
136
or non-business necessity requirement.”
A recent regulation
change adds the language: “In determining whether an
accommodation would impose undue hardship on the operation of
an employer’s business, factors to be considered include . . . [t]he
nature and cost of the accommodation needed, taking into
consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions and/or outside
137
funding.” As a practical concern, an employer may worry about loss
of federal funding if employees are using medical marijuana (which
138
If this proposed language is
is still illegal under federal law).
adopted, employers will be allowed to refuse accommodation of
medical marijuana use if they could stand to lose federal funding or
tax benefits by employing medical marijuana users.
There is a chance that an employer would be required to take
139
preemptive accommodation action for a medical marijuana user.
Regarding the need for an employee’s request for a reasonable
accommodation:
An employer must participate in an interactive process
when an employee makes a request for an accommodation.
An employer also may have to engage in the interactive
process even when the employee has not requested a
reasonable accommodation. In addition, an employer must
consider making a reasonable accommodation before
firing, demoting, or refusing to hire or promote a person
132

Id.
Id.
134
Id.
135
§ 13:13-2.5(b)(2).
136
Id.
137
§ 13:13-2.5(b)(3)(iii) (emphasis added).
138
See Susan K. Livio, Rutgers Declines Growing Medical Marijuana to Not Risk Federal
Funding (NJ.COM), July 24, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/
rutgers_declines_growing_medic.html.
139
See § 13:13-2.5(b)(2).
133
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with a disability because the disability precludes job
performance, regardless of whether the employee
140
requested an accommodation.
An employer can reject an employee if his or her handicap
141
makes him or her unable to perform the job. “For example, if an
applicant has a disability that prevents him from working certain
hours of the day, the employer must consider whether the applicant
142
can be accommodated by changing the hours or job duties.”
A
possible argument is that if an employee is in a safety-sensitive
position, an employee that uses medical marijuana for medical
purposes or otherwise would be unqualified for the position. As a
result, the employer would be able to deny or terminate employment
of medical marijuana employee-patients for these types of positions.
For employees working in non-safety-sensitive positions, the result
may not be as clear. How could it be said that the presence of THC
metabolites in a medical-marijuana patient makes them unable to
perform a job that entails, for example, jockeying spreadsheets in a
cubicle?
3.

Discharge Contrary to Public Policy
143

In Pierce v. Ortho Pharm Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court
created a cause of action for wrongful discharge for any employee
144
discharged “contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.”
The
source of public policy for purposes of a Pierce claim is expansive in
New Jersey and can include “legislation; administrative rules,
145
regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions.”
If an employee
fails to identify a “specific expression of public policy,” he or she “may
146
be discharged with or without cause.” An alleged source of public
policy will “not constitute a clear mandate” if it is “vague,
140

Michael D. Homans, Anti-discrimination Laws: New Jersey, THE PRACTICAL LAW
COMPANY (2011), at 4 http://www.flastergreenberg.com/media/site_files/
344_Anti_discrimination_Laws_New_Jersey.pdf (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:132.5(b)(2) (2011)).
141
Harris v. Middlesex Cnty. Coll., 801 A.2d 397, 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002) (“The [NJLAD] allows an employer freedom to reject those applicants who are
unable to do the job, whether because they are generally unqualified or because they
have a handicap that in fact impedes job performance. There should be no secondguessing the employer.”) (internal quotations omitted).
142
Homans, supra note 140, at 4.
143
Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d. 505 (N.J. 1980).
144
Id. at 512.
145
Id.
146
Id.
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controversial, unsettled, and otherwise problematic.” Although the
NJCUMMA constitutes adopted legislation and a clear mandate of
public policy, the policy that it establishes has nothing to do with
protecting medical-marijuana patients from adverse employment
148
action. The Act merely establishes a protection from state criminal
prosecution for medical marijuana patients in New Jersey. The Act
says nothing about protecting the employment rights of these
149
patients. Therefore, an employer who fires or chooses not to hire a
medical marijuana patient due to the results of a routine drug
screening is not denying the patient any right the NJCUMMA creates.
In this context, the employer is merely exercising its option not to
employ that person.
Without an amendment extending this
protection to potential patients, a Pierce claim related to a discharge
for a positive drug test stemming from medical marijuana use should
fail.
Regarding the interaction of Pierce public policy claims and
employee drug testing, the court in Hennessy indicated that the
discharge of an employee for “failing (or refusing to take) a random
test for illegal drug use implicates a clear mandate of public policy
protecting individual privacy rights,” but ultimately held that the
“discharge was lawful where [the] employee served in a safety150
sensitive position.”
The Hennessy court engaged in a balancing
analysis, weighing the employee’s individual privacy against the
151
public’s interest in safety.
The court found that the “public’s
interest in ensuring that workers in safety-sensitive positions are drugfree outweighs any individual right to privacy,” and that “safety
152
outweighs a right to privacy in off-duty activities.”
Hennessy,
153
however, dealt with a random drug screening and not mandatory
pre-employment drug screenings for all employees, and, as such, may
be limited to its facts. The court did note, however, that issues
regarding drug testing in the workplace are better addressed through
“legislative action or labor-relations agreements” than extensive
154
litigation.
This provides further support for the proposition that
147

MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 167 (N.J. 1996).
See discussion supra Parts II.A–B.
149
See discussion supra Part II.A.
150
MacDougall, 677 A.2d at 168 (discussing Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil
Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992)).
151
Hennessey, 609 A.2d at 20.
152
Id. at 21.
153
See id.
154
Id. at 23.
148
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the Legislature should amend the NJCUMMA to clarify that
employers are still free to maintain a drug-free work environment
and continue to implement drug-screening policies that may produce
adverse employment consequences for medical marijuana patients.
IV. LITIGATION IN OTHER STATES ON THIS ISSUE
Looking at litigation in other states can help predict how
litigation on this issue will unfold in New Jersey courts. To date,
there have been four major cases involving medical marijuana in the
155
employment context.
The court in each of these cases refused to
extend protection to plaintiffs who suffered adverse employment
action as a result of medical marijuana use. In line with these other
cases, and given the limited text and purpose of the NJCUMMA, a
New Jersey court is likely to, and correctly should, arrive at the
conclusion that the NJCUMMA does not create a new cause of action
for employees to use against their employers.
A. California (Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc.)
In Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc., the California
Supreme Court dealt with a claim from a plaintiff who was fired for
156
failing a pre-employment drug test. On the advice of his physician,
157
the plaintiff was using medical marijuana to treat chronic pain.
The plaintiff brought claims alleging that he was discharged because
of his disability, that his employer failed to make a reasonable
accommodation for his disability, and that his employer discharged
158
him in violation of public policy.
The plaintiff was a qualified
individual with a disability under California law, and was receiving
159
governmental disability benefits.
The court concluded that neither the text nor the history of
California’s medical-marijuana act suggested an intention to “address
160
the respective rights and duties of employers and employees.”
155

Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Mich. 2011); Ross v.
RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008); Emerald Steel Fabricators,
Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518 (Or. 2010); Roe v. TeleTech
Customer Care Mgmt., 257 P.3d 586 (Wash. 2011).
156
Ross, 174 P.3d at 202.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 203.
159
Id. (The plaintiff in this case suffered from chronic pain in the form of strain
and muscle spasms in his back. The plaintiff sustained these injuries while serving in
the armed forces.).
160
Id.
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Therefore, under California law, it is permissible for an employer to
take failed pre-employment drug tests into consideration when
161
As was the case in Ross, an
making employment decisions.
employer may fire an employee that tests positive for THC in a
required drug test, even if the employee furnishes a copy of a
physician’s recommendation that the employee use medical
162
marijuana.
The court noted that if California’s medical marijuana act had
given medical marijuana the same status as a legal prescription drug,
163
then the result of the case might have been different.
The court,
164
however, emphasized that the Act’s reach was not that broad.
Specifically, the Act exempted medical marijuana users from criminal
liability under state statutes and was not intended to address “the
165
respective rights and obligations of employers and employees.”
Like the NJCUMMA, California’s medical marijuana statute fails to
address problems that arise in the employment context—namely,
whether it offers any protection to employees who use marijuana for
166
medicinal purposes.
Furthermore, employer refusal to
accommodate does not affect the goal of the Act, which is to provide
immunity from state criminal liability—which, again, is the primary
167
purpose of the NJCUMMA as well.
California’s medical-marijuana act contains similar language to
168
the NJCUMMA on the issue of employer accommodation.
The
plaintiff’s argument in Ross, though ultimately unsuccessful, was that
this language should be read “as if it articulated express exceptions to
a general requirement of accommodation that appears only
169
implicitly.”
The court stated that this interpretation might have
merit “if the failure to infer a requirement of accommodation would

161

Id.
See Ross, 174 P.3d at 203.
163
Id. at 204.
164
See id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 205.
167
Id. at 206.
168
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2011) (stating that “[n]othing in this
act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use
of marijuana in any workplace”), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 11362.785(d)
(West 2011) (stating that “nothing in this article shall require any accommodation of
any medical use of marijuana on the property or premises of any place of
employment or during the hours of employment”).
169
Ross, 174 P.3d at 207.
162
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170

render the statute meaningless.”
Yet, the court held that this was
not the case, as the statute “can be given literal effect as negating any
expectation” that the protection from criminal liability under the Act
would give medical marijuana users “a civilly enforceable right to
171
possess the drug at work or in custody.”
The Ross court also rejected the plaintiff’s public policy
172
argument. Under California law, the public policy exception to the
general at-will employee regime requires the policy to be: (1)
supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision; (2) for the
benefit of the public as a whole rather than only the individual; (3) in
place at the time the employee is fired; and (4) “fundamental and
173
substantial.”
The court noted that California’s medical marijuana
act “does not speak to employment law” and in no way established a
public policy requiring employers to accommodate for employees
174
using the drug.
In dicta, the court also noted that the employer
had not prevented the plaintiff from having access to medical
175
These
treatment, but merely decided not to employ him.
requirements differ from the requirements under New Jersey’s public
176
policy exception.
The decision in Ross helps predict the result of litigation on this
issue in a New Jersey court. Like California’s act, the NJCUMMA
does not specifically address the rights and duties of employers and
177
employees. Further, like California’s statute, the Act does not give
medical marijuana the same status as a legal prescription drug—it
178
A
merely provides a protection from state criminal prosecution.
New Jersey court is likely to agree with the reasoning in Ross because
of these similarities. The limited protections the NJCUMMA creates
also provide support for rejecting any reasonable accommodation
claims or Pierce public policy claims.
B. Washington (Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Management,
LLC)
In Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Management, the Supreme Court
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Ross, 174 P.3d at 209.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra Part II.A.
See id.
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of Washington held that Washington’s medical-marijuana act did not
provide a private cause of action for a plaintiff-employee discharged
179
for the use of medical marijuana. The court also held that the Act
did not create a “clear public policy that would support a claim for
180
wrongful discharge in violation of such a policy.”
Therefore,
employers in Washington may discharge an employee for medical
marijuana use.
Regarding employee accommodation, Washington’s medical
marijuana act uses language similar to the language in the
181
NJCUMMA. The Roe court found that the language of the Act was
182
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
unambiguous.
because the statute “explicitly [did] not require an employer to
accommodate medical marijuana use ‘in any place of employment,’
the statute implicitly requires an employer to accommodate an
183
employee’s medical marijuana use outside the workplace.”
The
court stated that such an implicit obligation did not stem from the
184
Instead, the court held that the
explicit statement in the statute.
statute’s silence supported the conclusion that the employer was not
185
required to accommodate off-site medical marijuana use.
Turning to the history of the Act, the court found no support for
186
“reading an employment protection into the statute.”
The court
187
examined extrinsic evidence and determined that the evidence did
not support an interpretation that would require an employer to
188
accommodate off-site use of marijuana.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s public policy argument, the court
noted that, under Washington law, courts are instructed to “proceed
cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior
179

Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt., 257 P.3d 586, 588 (Wash. 2011).
Id.
181
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2010) (stating that “[n]othing in this
act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of
marijuana in any workplace”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011)
(stating that “[n]othing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site
medical use of cannabis in any place of employment . . . .”).
182
Roe, 257 P.3d at 590.
183
Id. at 591 (emphasis in original).
184
Id. at 592.
185
Id. at 593.
186
Id. at 592.
187
The examined evidence included the Drafter’s Declaration, the 2007
Amendments to the Act, and the voter pamphlet that went out when the Act was
passed.
188
Roe, 257 P.3d at 592.
180
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189

legislative or judicial expression on the subject.” Washington courts
construe this exception narrowly in an effort to avoid “swallow[ing]
190
These requirements
the general rule of at-will employment.”
appear to be stricter than the requirements of the public policy
191
exception under New Jersey law.
New Jersey and Washington have similar language in their
medical-marijuana statutes regarding employers’ accommodation of
192
employee use of marijuana in the workplace.
As such, a court in
New Jersey is likely to find, as the court did in Roe, that this limited
language is insufficient to establish an implicit requirement that an
employer accommodate an employee’s use of the drug outside the
workplace. Washington has amended its medical marijuana statute to
193
reflect the decision in Roe. The statute now includes the language
“[e]mployers may establish drug-free work policies. Nothing in this
chapter requires an accommodation for the medical use of cannabis
194
if an employer has a drug-free work place.” This is exactly the type
of language that the Legislature should add into the NJCUMMA. By
adding this language to the Act before medical marijuana is
distributed in New Jersey, the State can avoid fruitless litigation like
Roe in Washington.
C. Oregon (Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of Labor &
Industries)
The plaintiff in Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of Labor &
189

Id. at 595 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088
(Wash. 1984)).
190
Id. (citing Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Wash. 2001)).
191
Compare discussion supra Part III.B.3, with Roe, 257 P.3d at 595. Under
Washington law, the public-policy exemption to the at-will employment doctrine
contains four requirements:
(1) The plaintiffs must prove the existence of a clear public policy . . .
[;] (2) The plaintiffs must prove that discouraging the conduct in
which they engaged would jeopardize the public policy . . . [;] (3) The
plaintiffs must prove that the public-policy-linked conduct caused the
dismissal . . . [; and] (4) The defendant must not be able to offer an
overriding justification for the dismissal . . . .
Roe, 257 P.3d at 595.
192
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2010) (stating that “[n]othing in this
act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of
marijuana in any workplace”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011)
(stating that “[n]othing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site
medical use of cannabis in any place of employment . . . .”).
193
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011).
194
Id.
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Industries was a former part-time employee who had been anticipating
195
The plaintiff knew that he
an offer of permanent employment.
would have to pass a drug test as a condition of permanent
employment, so he revealed to his supervisor that he was a medical
196
marijuana patient.
One week later, the supervisor discharged the
197
The court ultimately concluded that federal preemption
plaintiff.
supported the conclusion that an employer was not required to
198
accommodate an employee’s off-site use of medical marijuana.
Oregon’s employee-protection statute does not apply to
employees who are “currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs, if
199
the employer takes an adverse action based on that use.” The court
reasoned that if medical marijuana use is an illegal use of drugs
within the meaning of Oregon’s employee-protection statute, then an
employer would be excused from engaging “in a meaningful
interactive process or otherwise accommodat[ing] employee’s use of
200
medical-marijuana.”
The court concluded that the Federal
Controlled Substances Act, which explicitly prohibits marijuana use
without regard to medicinal purpose, preempted the provision of the
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that affirmatively authorizes the use
201
of medical marijuana.
A New Jersey court is unlikely to conclude that federal
preemption is the deciding factor in a case similar to Emerald Steel.
Under New Jersey law, there is no explicit carve-out for illegal drug
202
use regarding an employer making a reasonable accommodation.
New Jersey courts have held that employee accommodation may still
be required in cases involving addiction or dependency on legal or
203
illegal drugs.
A New Jersey court is unlikely to adopt the same
“federal preemption” reasoning employed by the court in Emerald
Steel, but a New Jersey court is likely to arrive at the same conclusion—
that an employer is not required to accommodate an employee’s offsite use of medical marijuana. The text, history, and purpose of the
195

Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 520
(Or. 2010).
196
Id. at 521.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 520 (“Under Oregon’s employment discrimination laws, employer was
not required to accommodate employee’s use of medical marijuana.”).
199
Id. at 524.
200
Id. (citations omitted).
201
Emerald Steel, 230 P.3d at 536.
202
See supra Part III.B.
203
See supra Part III.B.
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NJCUMMA are sufficient grounds to find that an employer is not
required to accommodate an employee’s off-site use of marijuana if
the employer wishes to maintain a drug-free workplace. The option
to maintain a drug-free workplace notwithstanding the adoption of
the NJCUMMA should be preserved through an amendment to the
Act preserving this right.
D. Michigan (Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.)
The plaintiff in Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a case from the
Western District of Michigan, was an at-will employee who was fired
after testing positive for marijuana in a mandatory drug test following
204
a workplace injury.
Unlike the court in Emerald Steel, the court in
205
The court
Casias never reached the issue of federal preemption.
instead rested its holding on the fact that none of the protections the
plaintiff sought were found in the text of Michigan’s medical
206
marijuana statute.
The plaintiff advanced two theories in support of his wrongful
207
discharge claim.
The first claim was that the Michigan Medical
208
Marijuana Act (MMMA) created an implied right of action.
The
second claim was a cause of action based on a violation of the public
209
The court noted that the test for an
policy created by the Act.
210
implied private right of action under Michigan case law is stringent.
The court also discussed the apparent overlap of these two theories,
stating that “if the alleged public policy at issue is created by statute,
and if the statute does not itself create a private cause of action to
enforce the policy, where does a court receive the power to create a
211
remedy . . . ?” The court concluded that both claims failed because
under either of plaintiff’s theories he would have to show that “the
212
statutory policy at issue applies to this case.” The court concluded
that the plaintiff could not meet this requirement because Michigan’s
medical marijuana act only addresses adverse actions by the state, and
204

Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915 (W.D. Mich. 2011).
Id. at 920.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 921.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Casias, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (citing Lash v. City of Traverse City, 735 N.W.2d
628, 636–37 (Mich. 2007) (a private right of action cannot be inferred without
evidence of legislative intent)).
211
Id. at 921.
212
Id.
205
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213

does not regulate private employment.
The court examined the plain language of the MMMA and
found that it nowhere “state[d] that the statute regulates private
employment, that private employees are protected from disciplinary
action should they use medical marijuana, or that private employers
must accommodate the use of medical marijuana outside of the
214
workplace.” The court also addressed language in the MMMA that
215
The MMMA states
is similar to the language in the NJCUMMA.
that nothing in the act requires “[a]n employer to accommodate the
ingestion of marihuana in any workplace or any employee working
216
while under the influence of marihuana.” The language of the act
did not directly address employees who do not use marijuana in the
workplace or come to work under the influence but still test positive
217
for the drug.
Nevertheless, the court refused to hold that this “sole
mention of employment” operated as a “negative inference,
prohibiting private employers from disciplining an employee who
218
uses medical marijuana away from the workplace.” The court stated
that it could not “draw a negative inference about employment
protections when the remainder of the statute is silent on the rights
219
of employees.”
While the act provided protection from criminal
prosecution on state law, it did not provide employment protections
220
to medical marijuana users.
The Casias court also refused to create a new protected class
under Michigan law. The court stated that the argument the plaintiff
advanced would allow medical-marijuana users to “enjoy the kind of
employment safeguards offered to only a very few groups under
221
Michigan law.”
The court refused to do this because it “would
create a new protected employee class in Michigan and mark a
radical departure from the general rule of at-will employment in
222
Michigan.”
Given New Jersey’s expansive protections for many
223
classes of employees, the argument exists that a court in New Jersey
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 924.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26427(c)(2) (West 2011).
Casias, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Id.
Id. at 922.
See discussion supra in Part III.B (possible protection against discrimination

STARK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

438

1/9/2013 3:41 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:409

should consider creating a new protected class for qualified patients
with diseases and disabilities that are resistant to traditional
treatments and necessitate the use of medical marijuana. The limited
language of the NJCUMMA is similar enough to the language in the
MMMA that a court in New Jersey could adopt the reasoning in
Casias that the statute is limited to providing protection from state
criminal prosecution and does not create new employment
protections for medical marijuana users.
V. SUGGESTIONS
To avoid fruitless litigation, the issues regarding medical
marijuana in the employment law context must be clarified. This
clarification can be achieved by amending the text of the Act to
clearly state that employers are still permitted to establish drug-free
work policies. Additional language should be added reinforce the
principle that nothing in the NJCUMMA requires accommodation
for medical-marijuana patients if the employer wishes to maintain its
drug-free workplace. This will allow for the grant of a motion to
dismiss on these claims and prevent a drain on the resources of both
the courts and defendant-employers.
The Legislature should amend the NJCUMMA to include
language that allows employers to maintain drug-screening policies
that may inadvertently lead to the termination of medical-marijuana
patients. It would be too extreme to allow discrimination against
employees based solely on their status as a medical-marijuana patient,
and some protection could be provided against refusing to hire
224
someone based solely on this status.
This limited form of
protection need not address limiting adverse action against
employees or potential employees with marijuana metabolites in their
system as revealed in a drug screening. If an employer wishes to
maintain a drug-free work environment, and requires this for all
employees—medical marijuana patients and non-patients alike—the
employer should be allowed to do so. States that have included
225
overly protective language for employees have since retreated. New
for employees with, e.g., varicose veins, drug addiction).
224
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6-4 (West 2011) (“No . . . employer . . .
may refuse to . . . employ . . . or otherwise penalize a person solely for his or her
status as a cardholder.”).
225
See Hickox, supra note 7, at 1008–09 (noting that Maine’s medical marijuana
statute originally forbade subjecting an employee to “any disciplinary action by a
business or occupation based on his or her lawful use of medical marijuana,” but this
section was repealed effective January 1, 2011).
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Jersey would be wise to follow the lead of Washington and amend
the NJCUMMA to protect employers’ freedom to maintain a drugfree workplace.
VI. CONCLUSION
The existing canon of New Jersey employment law gives
discharged medical marijuana patients ample arguments to present
to the court. Due to the limited scope, language, and intent of the
NJCUMMA, however, none of these arguments are ultimately likely to
be successful.

226

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011) (“Employers may
establish drug-free work policies.
Nothing in this chapter requires an
accommodation for the medical use of cannabis if an employer has a drug-free work
place.”).

